The strike that led to widespread disruptions at Ben Gurion Airport on Thursday caused damage to the economy estimated at 25 to 30 million shekels. This is a preliminary estimate that includes the direct and indirect costs of shutting down operations.

The damage is reflected in lost passenger time, direct and operational costs to airlines, and lost revenue to the Israel Airports Authority and various airport operators. Add to that disruptions in cargo and baggage systems, damage to the supply chain, and losses to the tourism and hospitality sectors.
Beyond the immediate damage, the incident exposed three structural problems in Israel’s aviation infrastructure: limited capacity, dependence on a single operator, and the considerable power of the workers’ committee—which undermines the ability to create operational flexibility, improve efficiency, and advance the development of additional airports.
Ben Gurion Is at Maximum Capacity
Ben Gurion currently operates at its maximum daily capacity. That means any malfunction, strike, or unusual congestion can quickly cause widespread disruptions, with no alternative airport capable of absorbing a significant portion of the activity.

Supplementary airports are supposed to increase capacity and provide a solution in cases of shutdown or malfunction, but development plans are delayed. Every additional day that approval and construction of these airports don’t move forward increases the pressure on Ben Gurion and deepens Israel’s absolute dependence on it.
The Workers’ Committee’s Absolute Switch
The Israel Airports Authority is a monopoly that holds the national aviation infrastructure in its hands. The powerful workers’ committee concentrates considerable power through its control of operational positions, effectively holding the “switch” that can shut down the State of Israel’s entry and exit gates.

The absence of competing operators turns every isolated confrontation into an event with national impact. Creating competition among multiple airport operators would reduce the possibility of shutting down all aviation activity due to a business, organizational, or other consideration.
60% of Expenses Go to Salaries
Another problem concerns employment costs at the Airports Authority. Salaries at the Authority are significantly higher than the average salary in the economy, and salary costs reach about 60% of the organization’s total expenses.

The high operating expenses limit the budget available for infrastructure development and weigh on efficiency and service levels. The extensive use of Authority employees instead of concessionaires and additional operators also makes it difficult to create employment flexibility and reinforce systems on high-traffic days.
Steps to Prevent the Next Crisis
The required response begins with approving plans to establish supplementary airports at Ramat David and Tzakalag, alongside developing Ben Gurion’s capacity to the maximum possible. In parallel, the establishment of airports by private entities and the necessary legislation for this must be advanced.

The complementary step is formulating a comprehensive efficiency plan at the Airports Authority and changing its role even at existing airports—from a body that itself performs a significant portion of operations to a managing body. Expanding competition and operational flexibility could reduce the risk that another crisis will once again shut down the country’s gates.
