Following the partial gag order being lifted, it was cleared for publication today (Wednesday) that on July 16, 2026, the State Attorney’s Office filed a severe indictment with the Tel Aviv District Court against an Israeli citizen who served his regular and reserve military service in a classified unit. The defendant is accused of contact with a foreign agent and attempting to transmit information to benefit the enemy, after establishing contact with an entity presenting himself as an Iranian intelligence officer, and was even requested to assist in recruiting another soldier to facilitate contact with those hostile elements.
According to the details of the case uncovered in the investigation, the defendant—who previously served in a classified unit in both active duty and the reserves—established close contact with an individual who identified himself to him as an Iranian intelligence officer. As part of the alarming interactions with the foreign agent, the defendant not only cooperated but was also asked at a certain point to help recruit another soldier from within the IDF to establish contact with those foreign entities. The case is being handled and officially prosecuted by Attorney Irena Inberg of the Cyber Department at the State Attorney’s Office.
Following the exposure of the case, senior security officials in the Shin Bet, MALMAB (Director of Security for the Defense Establishment), the IDF, and the Israel Police issued a severe warning to all citizens and residents of the State of Israel, calling on them to refrain from any contact with foreign entities from enemy nations or unidentified individuals online and offline. Enforcement officials emphasized in their statement: “We call on citizens to report any suspicious or unusual contact to law enforcement authorities.”
In recent years and months, the Israeli defense establishment—including the Shin Bet and counterintelligence units within MALMAB—has been confronting a significant surge in repeated attempts by Iran’s security and intelligence agencies to locate, recruit, and operate Israeli citizens, with an emphasis on those with access to sensitive information, veterans of secret units, or active duty and reserve soldiers.
The primary cover operation method of these entities usually includes establishing contact under a false or fictional identity on social networks, offering promises of financial payment or using various manipulations to induce Israelis to hand over classified information or carry out espionage tasks.