Why am I not joining the euphoria over the Israel-Lebanon agreement? First, let’s be clear: the deal does include some genuinely significant achievements, chief among them the IDF remaining in the security zone with American backing and the historic recognition by Lebanon’s government of an Israeli presence—even if temporary—on its territory.
In addition, the agreement, reached under the auspices of Secretary of State Rubio, contradicts and somewhat balances the scandalous U.S.-Iran deal brokered by Vice President Vance. The Iranians demanded and continue to demand a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and it’s enough to hear the anguished cries of Naim Qassem to understand that this agreement deeply troubles Hezbollah and Iran.
But—and this is a big but: the text of the understandings between Israel, Lebanon, and the U.S. gives the IDF full freedom of action in the security zone, which implies that north of it, freedom of action is not full. In a reality where Iran is set to receive tens of billions of dollars soon, and perhaps even hundreds of billions down the line, the combination of that river of money with restrictions on Israel’s offensive activity guarantees a renewed, significant, and possibly rapid strengthening of Hezbollah.
In this context, the claim that the agreement made clear Iran no longer has any role in Lebanon may be true on paper, at the declarative level; but on the ground, at the practical level, Iran succeeded in forcing restrictions on IDF activity across most of Lebanese territory—including in Beirut, in Dahieh, and at Beirut’s airport, which may well return to serving as a major smuggling gateway for Hezbollah.
Under the current conditions created by the Trump administration’s reckless conduct, it’s not certain a better agreement could have been achieved; but it’s advisable to maintain a sober view of its advantages and limitations, and not get swept up in euphoria.